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In most of our decisions as parents or educators concerning how we should 
talk to children about difficult subjects, the question turns to what degree 
we should withhold the truth, how much information we should provide, 
or what details are appropriate. We, as adults, know the answer to the 
child's question, and the difficulty arises in figuring out what to convey and 
how. Questions about death and the afterlife are not like this. We - and by 
"we;' I mean especially educated adults of the Western world - are often as 
confused about what we should believe about these matters as are our chil-
dren. It seems that an initial step in our thinking about how to engage with 
children on this topic is to become clearer about how we ought to think 
about it. I will discuss this matter by engaging with the question of which 
norms ought to govern the formation and maintenance of our beliefs in 
general. We can then see how these norms would apply to beliefs about any-
thing supernatural. What we ought to believe does not settle the question 
of how we should talk to children about our beliefs; we do not always want 
our children's beliefs to match our own. There may be particular reasons we 
want our children to believe things we do not (like Santa Claus brings them 
presents) or not believe things we do (like their noncustodial parent is a 
jerk); but I will concentrate on how one is a responsible believer in general, 
which will provide insight into how we can educate children to be respon-
sible believers. 
In my first section, I discuss what it can mean to be responsible for 
beliefs given that one does not exercise control over beliefs the way one 
does over action. In section two, I turn to the question of whether it is 
possible to both believe without evidence and still believe responsibly. Most 
contemporary philosophers would deny the possibility of this conjunction, 
because most hold that an evidential norm governs belief, namely that 
one should only believe on sufficient evidence. It may seem that we often 
ll6 
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restrict the term "belief" to a less confident attitude. That is, when we have 
compelling evidence for a proposition, we would say we know it rather than 
merely believe it. Most philosophers think of knowledge as a particular kind 
of belief, one that is at least both true and justified. However, in evaluating 
beliefs, we can assess whether one has good reasons for holding a particular 
belief even if it falls short of knowledge. 
This evidentialist perspective allows two possible answers to what 
one should believe about what occurs after death or about the reason 
for seemingly bizarre or significant life events. The first is that we should 
suspend judgment about such matters because the evidence is silent - and 
when we have no evidence or the evidence is neutral, the proper evidentialist 
attitude is to refrain from forming a belief. The other possible response is 
to hold that the evidence favors the belief that there is nothing that occurs 
after death and there is no reason why events occur beyond what can be 
explained scientifically or causally. 
I argue that this evidentialist framework is impoverished and has led to 
a narrow and overly intellectual picture of the concept of belief. Arguments 
for evidentialism can show that evidential norms do a good job of provid-
ing us with general rules for belief maintenance, but once we understand 
the reason for why they ought to be followed in general, we see that these 
norms do not always hold. If beliefs are thought of as having a purpose, 
the purpose must be of a practical kind. Our beliefs serve the purpose of 
providing coherence, meaning making, prediction, and navigation, both 
individually and collectively. It is thus possible for these practical norms to 
override evidential ones. Once non-evidential norms are admitted, I argue 
some "supernatural" beliefs are permissible and can be responsibly believed. 
In my final section, I suggest some ways in which this conclusion impacts 
decisions about how to talk to children about death. 
RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL 
The notion of responsibility in the realm of believing is commonly invoked 
in ordinary practice. We express disapproval and approval for each other's 
beliefs; we ask in an incredulous tone, "How can you believe that?" or exclaim, 
"What a ridiculous thing to believe!" Such admonishments seem to reveal 
that we think the person in question has formed the belief irresponsibly, 
and it seems we hold him responsible for forming this belief. This notion 
of responsibility is not simply one that is pointing out the causal genesis of 
the belief. Holding someone responsible for his beliefs is not like holding 
the wind responsible for knocking over the tent. That we praise and blame 
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each other for the beliefs we hold seems to indicate, rather, that we view the 
beliefs one forms to be the consequence of one's agency. Yet attributions of 
responsibility and other deontological judgments in the doxastic (belief) 
realm are puzzling, for much of what we believe is beyond our control; we 
cannot decide to believe the way we can decide to act. It seems that such 
lack of control should excuse us from responsibility and judgment. 
We can formulate our puzzle by considering the following argument: 
The Voluntarism Argument 
i. If attributions of responsibility for beliefs are appropriate, then people 
have voluntary control over their beliefs. 
2. People do not have voluntary control over their beliefs. 
3. Attributions of responsibility about beliefs are not appropriate. 
Yet our practices seem to assume such attributions are appropriate. 
We would disapprove of someone who believes that whales are fishes or 
that her neighbor littered the sidewalk when she did not. We think a typ-
ically well-informed American ought to believe that the Earth revolves 
around the Sun and would be critical of someone who believes that the 
Sun revolves around the Earth. Yet it seems quite clear that one with such 
a belief could not just decide to change it in the direct way he could simply 
decide to change his shirt. Nor did he originally decide to acquire the belief 
the way one could decide to acquire a new pair of shoes. 
Three responses to this puzzle are possible. The first response denies 
the second premise, arguing that, at times, we can effectively decide to 
believe; this view has come to be called doxastic voluntarism. On one 
reading of Descartes's fourth meditation, he articulates a very robust form 
of such voluntarism. He says that our will is completely free to affirm or 
deny what is presented to the intellect: "The will consists solely in the fact 
that when something is proposed to us by our intellect either to affirm or 
deny, to pursue or to shun, we are moved in such a way that we sense that 
we are determined to it by no external force" (Descartes, i993, pp. 38-89). 
For Descartes, we are as free to choose our beliefs as we are our actions, 
and this is his explanation of both doxastic and moral error; it makes as 
much sense to blame me for my beliefs as it does my actions, which come 
from the same faculty. Thus, I can consider the proposition "The Sun 
revolves around the Earth;' and then decide whether to assent to it or not. 
According to Descartes, I ought to restrain my will and only assent to those 
propositions that are "clearly and distinctly represented to it [the will] by 
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the understanding:' I am thus clearly responsible for not restraining my 
will when I let myself believe those propositions that I "conceive more con-
fusedly and obscurely:' Although contemporary doxastic voluntarists are 
more moderate, they still hold that, at times, what one believes can result 
directly from a decision to believe. 
A second response to the puzzle argues that although we lack control 
over our beliefs, we can nonetheless be held responsible for them, thus deny-
ing the first premise. This is currently the most common response. Those 
who argue that we lack meaningful control in the doxastic realm must say 
what doxastic responsibility does require. If I cannot exercise control over 
my beliefs, what justifies holding me responsible? The answers given to this 
question say that when we admonish people for holding certain beliefs, we 
are really admonishing them for their defective characters or for their failure 
to cultivate certain virtues. So it is not the holding of the belief, for example, 
that the Sun revolves around the Earth that is blameworthy. Rather, there 
is something defective in the person who holds such a belief. Perhaps it is 
a character flaw that prevents him from being properly attentive or from 
weighing evidence properly. 
Finally, one can respond by accepting the argument as sound, and so deny 
that we are responsible for beliefs and argue that our common practices of 
attributions of responsibility are misguided; we are mistaken if we think, for 
example, someone should be praised or blamed for a belief he holds. Just as I 
cannot help feeling wet when rain falls on me or hot when the sun is strong, 
my believing that it is raining or the sun is strong is not something that is "up 
to me"; it is a state I find myself in when the world impinges on me in certain 
ways. On such a view, belief is a passive phenomenon and it must be able 
to do its job. David Hume is often invoked as the exemplar of such a view.' 
Although I ultimately think this is a mistaken characterization of Hume's 
view, some of what he says about belief supports this passive reading. 
If our practice of attributing responsibility for beliefs is appropriate, I 
think a sense needs to be articulated in which we do have a kind of control 
1 For example, David Owens (2000) characterizes Hume's position in the following way: "In 
denying the existence of epistemic agency, doxastic responsibility and intellectual free-
dom, Hume means to reject the idea that belief is subject to reason. He allows that beliefs 
are governed by the sort of biological norms that apply to the process of breathing, or the 
workings of the human heart but no one thinks us responsible for non-compliance with 
such norms:' (2) There are many passages in Hume's works where it is evident he does 
blame people for having or failing to have certain beliefs. How such admonishments are 
consistent with his theory of belief is a topic discussed extensively by Hume scholars. 
I discuss these issues in "Why Should We Be Wise?"(McCormick, 2005a) Hume Studies, 
Vol. 31, no 1, April 2005, pp. 3-19. 
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over our beliefs. In developing this notion of doxastic control, I draw from 
John Fischer's discussions of "guidance control:' A central feature of this 
kind of control is the idea of "ownership:' Those aspects of our lives for 
which we take responsibility are the ones we own. I will argue that we can 
own our beliefs and that we expect each other to do so. Beliefs are products 
of our agency, something we have an active role in shaping and maintain-
ing. Although we cannot believe at will, neither are we passive in the beliefs 
we form and maintain. We take responsibility for our beliefs, and taking 
responsibility includes taking control of them. We are blamed when we lose 
this grasp, when we do not exercise our reflective competence that helps us 
believe the way we ought to believe. 
It may seem, then, that I am siding with the voluntarists and so deny-
ing the second premise of the Voluntarism Argument. Yet I do not think 
a belief can arise directly from a decision to believe. Many of those who 
oppose doxastic voluntarism admit that we have a kind of indirect control 
over beliefs, but they do not think our attributions of responsibility are tied 
in any way to this kind of control. The kind of control for which I will argue 
is not the indirect kind that these theorists concede; it is not simply derived 
from other states over which we do have control. It may be, in the end, that 
the kind of control I claim we have over beliefs is robust enough to count 
me among the moderate doxastic voluntarists. It may be that it lacks 
sufficient directness for those who advocate doxastic voluntarism. It matters 
little into which category the account is placed. What I want to defend is 
(i) that attributions of responsibility and other deontological judgments 
about beliefs are appropriate, and (ii) these attributions and judgments pre-
suppose that we have control in the doxastic realm. 
One of the reasons it may seem that we lack control over our beliefs is 
that so many of them are unavoidable and irresistible. If it is impossible for 
me to avoid holding a particular belief, how can I be said to have any control 
over my holding it? For doesn't being in control entail that I could have done 
otherwise or could have chosen differently? Many theorists have been con-
cerned with formulating a concept of control (and responsibility) that does 
not entail that one could have done otherwise. For if causal determinism is 
true (or if God has created one and only one perfect world plan), there may 
be a sense in which we can never act other than we do. However, it seems 
we would not want our notions of responsibility and all the practices that go 
along with them to be rendered meaningless if it turned out that we did live 
in a deterministic universe. John Fischer calls the kind of control that does 
not entail alternative possibilities "guidance control:' To illustrate the kind 
of thing he has in mind, imagine that you are driving a car that is a "driver 
Responsible Believing 121 
instruction" automobile with dual controls. As long as you are driving in a 
relatively safe manner, the instructor lets you control the car, and so when 
you, at the correct time, turn to the right, it is you who is guiding the car to 
the right. If you had shown signs of confusion and were about to mistakenly 
turn to the left, however, the instructor would have stepped in and steered it 
to the right. Thus you could have gone in no other direction but to the right. 
So although you have guidance control over the car, you lack what Fischer 
calls "regulative control" - the instructor has that. 
In their book, Fischer and Mark Ravizza provide detailed elaboration 
of this concept of guidance control and argue that it is sufficient for moral 
responsibility. They are adamant that responsibility requires control, just 
not the kind of "regulative control" that requires alternative possibilities. 
An agent exhibits guidance control of an action "insofar as the mechanism 
which actually issues in his action is his own, reasons-responsive mech-
anism'' (Fischer and Ravizza, i998, p. 39). Some theorists have argued 
that only reasons-responsiveness is needed, but if all that were required 
for responsibility is that the mechanism issuing in the action (or belief) 
is reasons-responsive, then even if you were directly manipulated (say, 
had scientists kidnapped you and implanted such a reasons-responsive 
mechanism), you would still be responsible. 
For the mechanism that actually issues in certain behavior to be one's 
own, one must take responsibility for it. Taking responsibility is understood 
historically. As one comes to view oneself as an agent, as having an effect 
on the world as a consequence of one's intentions and decisions, one comes 
to view oneself as a fair target for the reactive attitudes such as punishment 
or praise. By viewing oneself as an appropriate target for the consequence 
of a particular mechanism (say, ordinary practical reasoning), one thereby 
takes responsibility for it and the behavior resulting from it. Once one takes 
responsibility for a particular mechanism, then this ownership extends to 
future operations of the mechanism. It is a process that occurs over time, 
in which we develop a concept of ourselves as engaged in a kind of conver-
sation. When we are addressed and treated as responsible agents through 
such attitudes as praising and blaming, we begin to form an internal view of 
ourselves as responsible and develop our own way of assessing and reacting 
to others. Fischer and Ravizza describe the process like this: "The goal of 
achieving a correlation between external and internal attitudes supports the 
practices that we use to train individuals who are not yet full members of 
the moral community and to encourage them to develop the internal view 
that we are extending to them" (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998, p. 212). Thus, taking 
responsibility need not be any conscious act; rather, the way we react to 
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others and feel about ourselves reveals whether we have taken responsibility 
for the mechanism in question. 
Can this notion of a mechanism be intelligibly applied to the doxastic 
realm? Fischer and Ravizza are clear that all they mean by "mechanism" is 
the process that leads to the relevant upshot. This upshot is some kind of 
behavior, and by "behavior" they mean to include actions and omissions. 
They also consider that the upshot may be a trait of character or, as we shall 
see, perhaps an emotional reaction. It seems plausible that one such upshot 
can be a belief. Examples they give of mechanisms or processes are delib-
eration, practical reason, brain-stimulation, irresistible (physically based) 
urges, hypnosis, addiction, and intentions. Given how broadly mechanisms 
are construed, it seems perfectly legitimate to talk about the mechanisms 
that result in beliefs. Some of the processes that result in beliefs are inquiry, 
evidence gathering, attending, reasoning, memory, and perception. We can 
now ask if any of these mechanisms are such that we can take responsibil-
ity for them. Can we own them as a consequence of our agency the way 
we can the mechanisms that lead to actions? I think we can see that this is 
possible if we think about our capacity to feel guilty about having certain 
beliefs. So imagine that I believe, on inadequate evidence, that my brother 
stole some money from me. I discover my error, perhaps by finding the 
money or finding the real thief. Even if I never acted on it in any way, I 
can still feel guilty for having formed this belief at all. Those who deny that 
responsibility entails control will say my guilt is not really about holding 
this belief, and it certainly is not about a failure of control, but rather it is my 
feeling bad about not being a good person in general. Yet if I really viewed 
myself as lacking control over this belief, would I feel the same kind of guilt 
for having it? Say I discovered that I had undergone some kind of psychic 
manipulation such that the mechanism responsible for issuing in beliefs 
about my brother was one that was controlled (via some remote control) by 
some evil scientist. I may still feel some shame and view myself as somehow 
defective, but part of the reason I feel guilty has to do with this beliefbeing 
a result of my agency. I have taken responsibility for the mechanism issuing 
in evidentially based beliefs. When the mechanism is faulty it is my fault, 
and I can be said to have lost some control over this mechanism given that 
I am failing to guide my beliefs appropriately. 
That some notion of control is in play when assigning blame to beliefs 
is reinforced if we consider when and why we mitigate such blame. If you 
cannot make your higher-order judgments effective about how you ought 
to believe, there is a sense in which your belief is no longer your own; you 
are divided and overpowered. In such a case I would blame you less if you 
Responsible Believing 123 
really are compelled to believe in a way that deviates from how you ought 
to. You are not as open to blame as someone who can believe the way he 
ought but who fails to put in the care and effort required to do so.2 Let us 
now look at a number of different cases of defective believing and see where 
we are apt to assign responsibility and where we are not. It seems that the 
more control we have over the belief-issuing processes, the more likely we 
are to attribute responsibility for it. This kind of control seems to come in 
degrees, and the more control we have, the less it seems we are apt to miti-
gate responsibility. 
Many of our beliefs result from perception. Perceptual beliefs also seem 
to be the ones that are most obviously not under one's regulative control. 
However, if we think again about what it means to take responsibility and 
accept that this is properly seen as a developmental process, it seems that 
even this most apparently passive mechanism is one over which we do have 
some degree of guidance control. Imagine that someone is insistent that 
he sees a unicorn galloping toward him, and based on the usual trustwor-
thiness of his senses, believes there is a unicorn galloping toward him. If, 
however, this person is aware that he just took powerful hallucinogenic 
drugs and still believes there is a unicorn galloping toward him, it seems 
appropriate for us to criticize him. For if I point out to you reasons for 
thinking that your normally well-functioning mechanism has gone awry, 
you should revise your assessment of the resulting upshot. Further, you see 
yourself as appropriately chastised for being overly confident or hasty in 
the proper functioning of this mechanism. Imagine a case of mispercep-
tion that is not a result of an external agent (like a hallucinogenic drug). 
Sam believes his girlfriend was kissing Jack in the car, and he believes this 
because he saw her doing so. It turns out she was, in fact, not kissing Jack, 
and somehow his perception was faulty and misled him into forming a 
faulty belief. If through pleading and insistence, Sam's girlfriend convinces 
him that she did not kiss Jack, how should Sam view the belief he formed? 
It seems appropriate that he should feel some shame about it, and again, he 
should be criticized for forming and maintaining it. 
Of course, it is not possible for us to constantly monitor our perceptual 
faculties to ensure that they are operating free of biases or neuroses that 
may be leading us astray. Yet there is some presumption that we should be 
ready to do some monitoring to ensure that this mechanism for which we 
have taken responsibility is operating correctly. If I find this mechanism is 
regularly leading me astray, it seems that there is something wrong with me. 
2 I offer a model of a loss of doxastic control in "Compelled Belief" (McCormick, 2005b ). 
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It would not seem appropriate for me to insist that "these beliefs result from 
perception over which I lack control and so it is not my fault that I keep 
forming false beliefs:' If your perceptual faculties really are "taken over;' say, 
by some severe psychosis, a point does come where we would excuse you 
from responsibility. However, this again underscores the difference of our 
assessment in the nonpathological case in which we think assessments of 
responsibility are appropriate, and so some degree of control is possible. 
Another common belief-issuing mechanism is memory, and again, like 
perception, this seems to be a process over which I exercise relatively little 
control. If I have a very vivid memory of an occurrence, it seems almost 
impossible for me to fail to believe that the thing occurred. However, as 
in the case of perception, thinking about when and how this mechanism 
goes awry can help show that the appropriateness of attributions of respon-
sibility are tied to our having some guidance control over this process. 
Unfortunately, I think we have all been in the following situation: Imagine 
you are conversing with a friend, and you start talking about a conference 
you were both at the previous summer. You begin recalling together who else 
was at the conference. You say, "Oh and John was there - I remember liking 
his talk:' Your friend insists that John was not there, and you are emphatic 
that you remember him being there. If the next day, your friend shows you 
the program and convinces you that you misremembered, it seems you will 
feel very sheepish about your firm belief that John was there, and a certain 
degree of blameworthiness seems appropriate for you having this belief. 
One may think it is not the believing that is blameworthy, but rather your 
having certain character traits like dogmatism or overconfidence that we 
blame you for. Even if I rarely find myself emphatically persisting in my 
belief and so do not have this character trait, it seems I am blameworthy in 
this instance. 
Contrast this case again with a pathological one. If someone has 
Alzheimer's disease and so has a severely defective memory mechanism, 
there comes a point in which we excuse him from responsibility in his 
memory-induced beliefs; at the point in which he loses ownership of the 
process, he becomes incapable of correction and of keeping his beliefs 
in line with his and others' judgments. As such diseases are often grad-
ual, we can find that, at first, we do continue to react in ways that reveal 
we hold the agent responsible for his beliefs. We will say with frustration, 
"Don't you remember? You left the keys on your desk:' As the disease pro-
gresses, however, such admonishments seem less and less appropriate. Just 
as lack of control over one's faculties excuses one from being admonished 
for how one acts, similarly it excuses one from being admonished for how 
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one believes. Again, it is not a question of whether I could have believed 
otherwise about John's presence at the conference. Rather, this is a belief 
that I have ownership over in that I have the capacity to keep it in line with 
how I think I ought to believe. 
Attributions of responsibility are the most obviously warranted in 
cases where beliefs result from deliberation or inquiry, and these are 
processes over which we clearly have guidance control. These mecha-
nisms are responsible for issuing in actions as well as beliefs. One of 
the examples that Fischer and Ravizza consider is taking responsibility 
for "acting from the mechanism of practical reason:' They refer to 
these actions as "reflective actions:' Beliefs that come about as a result 
of reflection are clearly ones for which we have taken responsibility in 
Fischer and Ravizza's sense. 
How, then, would this account of doxastic guidance control address the 
initial puzzle of doxastic responsibility? Consider again the example of the 
person who thinks the Sun revolves around the Earth. The most prevalent 
view argues that our criticism of one's holding this belief is in no one way 
tied to whether having the belief or not is in one's control. I have argued that 
such criticism and other manifestations of attributions of responsibility are 
tied to our expectations that one can do better. We expect a well-informed 
American to be sensitive to the amount of evidence that supports the helio-
centric view and expect that his belief will conform to this evidence. This 
expectation comes, at least in part, from the fact that he has seen himself as 
a fair target for being chastised in this way, that he takes responsibility for 
what he believes, and sees his beliefs as issuing from himself as an agent. 
These are all the necessary components of guidance control. If one does not 
exhibit this kind of control, it would be inappropriate to criticize him or 
otherwise hold him responsible. 
THE LIMITS OF EVIDENTIALISM 
The examples I have given of faulty beliefs seem to support the view that 
believing responsibly entails believing on sufficient evidence. If in the 
investigation of grounds for believing, one discovers that one lacks evi-
dence or epistemic reasons for one's belief, it seems the responsible believer 
will give up that belief. This is the dominant view among contemporary 
philosophers: They say that evidential norms govern beliefs; I should follow 
my evidence and only believe when the evidence is sufficient. Closely tied 
to this view is that following evidence will tend to provide me with true 
beliefs, and that beliefs aim at truth. 
126 Miriam McCormick 
I think it is important to acknowledge that truth and knowledge are 
sub-goals; they are instrumental, not intrinsic goods, and so the possibil-
ity is left open that they can be trumped by other norms or goals. If the 
purpose of belief is to help us achieve our goals, flourish, and be excellent 
human beings, it is possible that some beliefs can do this independently 
of their truth value or of their being evidentially based. 
In fleshing out his evidentialist thesis, Richard Feldman says that if one 
adopts any attitude toward a proposition, "that person ought to believe 
it if his current evidence supports it, disbelieve it if his current evidence 
is against it, and suspend judgment about it if his evidence is neutral (or 
close to neutral)" (Feldman, 2000, p. 683). It is the last part of this claim 
I wish to question. There may be times when there is no evidence (and 
so is neutral), but that it can still be permissible or even a good thing to 
believe something. There is some evidence from cognitive psychology that 
suggests that not only have we humans evolved to be able to decode and 
interpret meaning from our fellow creatures, but that our brains have also 
adapted to see meaning in life events. To see both other people and life 
events as meaningful is a distinctive human capacity and one that those 
with certain cognitive disorders (like autism) lack. In a sense, it is a devel-
opmental accomplishment to be superstitious. This meaning making could 
translate into a theistic or religious perspective, but it need not. Even those 
people whose illusions have been disrupted by science still have a lot of 
trouble letting go of this naturally adapted interpretive power. 
Jesse Bering calls this capacity to see significance in life events having 
an existential theory of mind (EtoM). He says, "it is my impression that we 
would be hard pressed to discover an individual of normal cognitive func-
tioning who has never exercised his or her EToM:' He asks us to imagine 
the following: 
You are on a crowded bus, lost in the newspaper before you, when 
suddenly you are caught in a dizzy fury of screams, blackness and 
crushing metal. Your bus has crashed and flipped over a steep embank-
ment. You crawl out of the window, dust yourself off, and realize that you 
are the sole survivor out of dozens of other passengers. If a week from 
now, or a year or decade later, you find yourself asking, "Why me?" then 
quite simply you have an intact EToM. Even if you brush such questions 
aside because you see them as rather foolish, you still betray your EToM 
insofar as you can entertain this type of question in the current context. 
(Bering, 2002, p. i) 
One could see this as evolutionary design of self-deception, but if we are 
adapted to believe in meaning, it seems this adaptation serves a purpose. 
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Maybe it is an outdated purpose and one we should try to get rid of, like 
"natural" male aggression when faced with rivals. Feldman, and others, 
would clearly see these beliefs as irrational (and irresponsible) because 
they violate evidentialist injunctions. However, if we remember the rea-
son for following evidentialist norms (because they will help us maximize 
epistemic value) and if this value is instrumental (it is valuable because it 
helps us flourish and contributes to our overall good), then these kinds of 
meaning-making beliefs may be another way of serving this greater good. 
We want our beliefs to conform to our view of the world, to help us 
succeed in the world, to make us happier. Yet once the practical side is 
acknowledged it becomes clear that even though evidential norms generally 
govern belief formation, there are times when it may be rational to believe 
despite a lack of evidence. The problem with this acknowledgment is that 
we want a way of distinguishing the "warranted" non -evidentially based 
beliefs from those that are not warranted. 
I think there is an important difference between believing against your 
evidence and believing when you have no evidence or the evidence is 
neutral. The difference can be illustrated by reflecting on the nineteenth-
century debate between W.K. Clifford and William James. Here is Clifford's 
flourishing defense of evidentialism: 
It is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything 
on insufficient evidence ... Belief, that sacred faculty which prompts 
the decisions of our will, and knits into harmonious working all the 
compacted energies of our being, is ours not for ourselves, but for 
humanity ... Every hard-worked wife of an artisan may transmit to her 
children beliefs which shall knit society together, or rend it in pieces. No 
simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the universal duty 
of questioning all that we believe. (Clifford, i987, p. 24) 
In the case of believing against evidence, I think Clifford is right; believing 
in this way is harmful and opposed to collective good. However, James is 
right in the second context, the context in which we have no evidence or it 
is equally balanced. In James's, "The Will to Believe;' he responds directly 
to Clifford's strong evidentialist stance. He agrees that in many contexts, 
evidential considerations will settle the matter, but on questions that cannot 
be decided by the evidence, he says the following: 
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option 
between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its 
nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circum-
stances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open;' is itself a passional 
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decision, - just like deciding yes or no, - and is attended with the same 
risk oflosing the truth. (James, i956) 
If our "passional" nature has developed to form beliefs about there being 
significance or meaning in life events, even when there is no evidence, this 
may give further support for James's view. 
In helping to further flesh out this distinction between non-evidentially 
based beliefs that are pernicious and those that are not, it is helpful to think 
of true belief as a common good, that the value of true beliefs is comparable 
to the value of clean water.3 It may be the case that a particular body of water 
is of no value to me, and so ifl pollute it I will not suffer; but we still think it 
is wrong because the water has value and should be respected, regardless of 
whether it is useful to me; clean water plays such an indispensable role in our 
well-being, we have an obligation - to others - not to pollute in this way, but 
rather to treat clean water with due respect. Similarly, not every true belief 
is of value to me; it may even be that one can be harmful. It is because, in 
general, having true beliefs and knowledge is helpful for an individual and 
useful for society, that they are valuable. Yet it may also be good and useful 
for society for people to see meaning in life. Non-evidentially based beliefs 
that detract from the common good are different from ones that contribute. 
I will consider two objections to this distinction. It seems that some 
obviously false beliefs, or ones that go against all evidence, can be very 
useful. Imagine that a plane crashes in the middle of winter high in the 
Rocky Mountains and some people survive. It seems that, even if all evi-
dence points to the likeliness of their imminent demise, it would be good 
for the survivors to believe against their evidence that they can live. There 
are abundant examples of people ignoring the evidence of the doctors who 
tell them they only have a few months to live and such ignoring, perhaps, 
allows them to live longer. In these cases, even though one can gain person-
ally by believing against the evidence, and we would excuse these believers, 
they are still cases of pernicious believing. It is important that, in general, 
we do not believe in this way; the value of attending - of not ignoring - evi-
dence is of more importance overall than the individual value of believing 
against the evidence in particular cases. The situation is analogous to the 
value of truth telling. Telling a lie in a particular case can be very valuable 
and excusable, but this does not undermine the general moral rule that 
lying is wrong. I think in the cases where there is no evidence, or where 
there is neutral or barely any evidence, there is nothing pernicious about 
believing in a way that contributes to your well-being (and perhaps overall 
3 I have taken this analogy from Stephen Grimm (Grimm, 2009). 
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common good). A caveat needs to be added here. Beliefs that lead directly 
to harmful acts may not be permissible, but this is not because they vio-
late evidentialism; rather, it is because they are so closely tied to immoral 
action. I will return to this question later. 
Second, one may think in the Bering-type cases, where one sees life 
events as significant, or in questions about what happens after death, that 
the evidence is not silent. One may think that the principle of simplicity 
shows that the straightforward causal explanation of why you didn't get 
killed in the bus wreck is the one supported by the evidence, and so it would 
be pernicious to believe that there was anything significant in your survival. 
Bering imagines three cases of mothers - an autistic mother, a religious 
mother, and a nonreligious mother with normal cognitive functioning -
and we are told that each of them just sadly lost her infant as a result of a 
disease. He says, "We might expect the following responses (or something 
similar) after asking them why the death occurred ... the autistic mother 
would speculate that cancerous lesions had gotten a stronghold on her 
baby's immunosuppressive system; the religious mother would tell us that it 
was the will of God; and the nonreligious mother would tell us that her baby 
died so that she can help other bereaved mothers" (Bering, 2002, p. 20). 
Someone defending the view that the evidence is not silent on these 
questions of why things happen would have to say that the autistic person's 
answer is the one that exhibits the "correct" belief. Yet there is something 
disturbing in this response, some kind oflack of humanity. James would say 
that this is a case where our passions have a role to play in what we believe. 
The problem with the autistic mother is that she has no access to those 
passions, or emotions, that help answer the question of why her baby died. 
For her the "why" question cannot be anything but "what was the cause?" 
Rather than see the noncausal "why" question as meaningless, we could 
see it as a question which cannot be answered based on the evidence. One 
could then answer by saying, "I don't know why;' but it does seem that one 
has a certain degree of freedom with respect to what one believes about 
it. Rather than try to force beliefs of this kind into an evidentialist frame-
work, I think it is better to expose this framework as impoverished - admit 
that we have no evidence about why our infants die or what happens after 
death, but still see our beliefs in these matters - whatever they are - as 
permissible. I say "whatever they are;' but a caveat is needed here. Beliefs 
that lead directly to harmful acts may not be permissible, but this is not 
because they violate evidentialism. Rather, it is because they are so closely 
tied to immoral action. I will return to this issue of how much flexibility is 
acceptable in these matters in my final section. 
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When I say these non-evidentially based beliefs are valuable, I do not 
mean merely epistemically valuable. Some will agree that they are pruden-
tially or morally valuable, but that they are incorrect from an epistemic or 
doxastic perspective. For example, Feldman argues that the "ought" regard-
ing belief is an epistemic ought that is distinct from the oughts of morality 
or of prudence. He has argued that if these oughts conflict, there is no way 
to adjudicate between them, no meaningful question about what I ought 
to believe, all things considered: "We've disambiguated 'ought' and we can't 
put the various senses back together again'' (Feldman, 2000, p. 694). I think 
this separation of evaluative domains is problematic. There may indeed 
be a source of normativity that provides force to our practical, moral, and 
epistemic judgments. Feldman wonders what value would be associated 
with this "just plain ought:' This is a good and difficult question, but not 
necessarily one that is meaningless or unanswerable. Maybe we just plain 
ought to do what most contributes to human excellence. It may be hard 
to adjudicate between different dimensions of excellence, but it could be a 
meaningful adjudication nonetheless. 
The source of normativity that gives truth and knowledge value is the 
same source that gives value to acting according to common good. When 
we say one ought to act a certain way and when we say one ought to believe 
a certain way, the source of these "oughts" is not entirely distinct. It seems 
there is an ought associated with all our activities as agents, whether these 
result in beliefs or in actions; beliefs are products of our agency, something 
we have an active role in shaping and maintaining. Although we cannot 
believe at will, neither are we passive in the beliefs we form and maintain. 
We take responsibility for our beliefs, and taking responsibility includes tak-
ing control of them. We are blamed when we lose this grasp, when we do not 
exercise our reflective competence that helps us believe the way we ought to 
believe. Doxastic, moral, and prudential faults are all faults of agency. 
EDUCATING CHILDREN TO BELIEVE RESPONSIBLY 
If how one ought to believe is importantly connected to how one ought to 
act, then teaching our children to believe responsibly is just one part of their 
broader moral education. Here there can be disagreement over the best way 
to teach children to treat others well, to be kind and honest, and so forth, and 
I do not here have the space to fully defend one perspective on this topic. It 
seems to me, drawing on my experience as both a mother and teacher of 
moral philosophy, that it is best to articulate a clear set of rules but to insist 
on reflection concerning these rules - to realize that for even the seemingly 
Responsible Believing 131 
most fixed rules, a time can arise when they can be legitimately violated. 
We know this from "ticking time bomb" thought experiments. Raise the 
stakes high enough - to saving the entire universe - and it becomes unclear 
whether torture is not morally acceptable. Teaching children to be reflective, 
attentive, to avoid hasty judgments will all tend toward supporting evidential 
norms for belief. Yet when it comes to questions about death or "supernatural" 
phenomena, they will have some flexibility in how they believe. How much 
flexibility? Is any belief permissible when the evidence is silent? Here I return 
to the caveat I mentioned earlier concerning beliefs that are very closely 
tied to harmful actions. When we blame someone for having a racist belief, 
although part of this judgment is owing to the epistemic vices displayed in 
forming the belief, part of the blame stems from knowledge of how closely 
tied such beliefs are to treating others unjustly. Similarly, some beliefs about 
the afterlife are closely tied to questionable moral practices. If your belief 
about the afterlife entails that I will suffer eternal damnation, this will impact 
the way you think about me and treat me. Or perhaps even more worrisome 
are beliefs about the afterlife that seem to condone suicide for a God-serving 
cause. It seems likely that the strong evidentialist dictum that supports sus-
pending judgment when the evidence is silent is motivated by the worry that 
permitting freedom here will permit beliefs of this kind. Yet beliefs about a 
greater power or in something transcendent can also bring one to care more 
about others, to recognize a connection among all humans and all nature, 
and to view the world in a more positive and beautiful light than if one chose 
to suspend judgment. Furthermore, as James pointed out, when there is no 
evidence even suspension is a choice. It seems that as parents and educators 
we can teach our children that it is in these moments, the rare ones when one 
is faced with some freedom of what to believe, that one has to think carefully 
about what kind of person one wants to be and recognize that the beliefs we 
adopt both express and shape who we are. 
A further worry about accepting that evidential norms do not always 
prevail is that it may seem to legitimize some policies that we would not 
want to condone. An example of such a practice is the teaching of intelligent 
design as part of a standard school curriculum. 
As I hope is clear from this discussion, evidential norms can only be 
overridden in rare contexts - contexts in which evidence is either silent on 
the issue or where the evidence is completely balanced. Neither of these 
is the case when it comes to belief about the truth of evolution. To dis-
believe evolution requires active suppressing or ignoring of the evidence. 
These constitute epistemic vices that are unacceptable. One could recognize 
that some beliefs are resilient and persist even while the epistemic grounds 
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are suspect. However, to teach others to hold views that require a kind of 
shutting out of overwhelming empirical data is not a sound practice. 
Yet it is also important to recognize that in every domain, there will be 
some presuppositions that are and must remain unquestioned. For science 
to be so successful in its predictive power and practical success, it must 
rely on certain assumptions. In ordinary life, I must accept certain truths 
without grounds or evidence just to be able to navigate my way in what 
(I assume to be) the world. The beauty of philosophical thinking and 
philosophy courses is they offer us a chance to examine and question these 
presuppositions. We can ask why one sort of thing counts as evidence and 
another does not. We can quite seriously doubt the external world hypoth-
esis and wonder whether there is an objective world beyond my private 
thoughts. We can even examine why the creation story of Genesis has been 
seen as a real alternative explanation of the universe by some people. Yet to 
give it equal attention and legitimacy as a naturalistic explanation would be 
akin to, in the very earliest stages of the teaching of basic science, introduc-
ing the evil-demon hypothesis as an equally plausible explanation of what 
causes our sense-perceptions. No question should be deemed unacceptable 
and no topic entirely closed for discussion. Yet the overwhelming success 
of certain presuppositions - including the presupposition that evidential 
norms guide belief - permits us to rely on them most of the time. It should 
not be forgotten, however, that their value is ultimately practical. 
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